Digital Start-Ups in the Global South: Embeddedness, Digitality and Peripherality in Latin America (26) by Quinones, Gerardo et al.
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
UK Academy for Information Systems 
Conference Proceedings 2017 UK Academy for Information Systems 
Spring 4-5-2017 
Digital Start-Ups in the Global South: Embeddedness, Digitality 
and Peripherality in Latin America (26) 
Gerardo Quinones 
University of Manchester, gerardo.quinones@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk 
Richard Heeks 
University of Manchester, richard.heeks@manchester.ac.uk 
Brian Nicholson 
University of Manchester, brian.nicholson@manchester.ac.uk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/ukais2017 
Recommended Citation 
Quinones, Gerardo; Heeks, Richard; and Nicholson, Brian, "Digital Start-Ups in the Global South: 
Embeddedness, Digitality and Peripherality in Latin America (26)" (2017). UK Academy for Information 
Systems Conference Proceedings 2017. 85. 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/ukais2017/85 
This material is brought to you by the UK Academy for Information Systems at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has 
been accepted for inclusion in UK Academy for Information Systems Conference Proceedings 2017 by an 
authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact 
elibrary@aisnet.org. 
Digital Start-Ups in the Global South: 
Embeddedness, Digitality and Peripherality 






 & Brian Nicholson
c
 











There is debate about the extent to which digital activity is embedded or disembedded from various 
aspects of its context including place, institutions and networks.  Yet little research has so far been 
conducted on this issue in relation to digital enterprises, particularly those in developing countries.  
Because of the growing importance of the digital economy in developing countries, an interview- and 
observation-based research study was undertaken of digital start-ups in the four largest Latin 
American economies, using the Triple Embeddedness Framework as its conceptual foundation.  It finds 
that digital start-ups are multiply embedded: in both product and digital sector regimes, in both local 
and global industry regimes, and also in their economic and socio-political environment.  This hybrid 
embedding is often a source of strength, particularly when embeddedness is strong enough to provide 
flows of knowledge and other resources but not so strong as to constrain innovation.  The digitality of 
these start-ups helps achieve this “Goldilocks”/“just right” level of embeddedness in the digital sector, 
and in local and global contexts.  Developing country positioning on the relative periphery of the 
global economy is also relatively helpful; allowing ideas to flow in but offering some protection from 
external competition.  Some conclusions are drawn for government policy, business strategy and 
conceptualisation of digital embeddedness. 
 






There is a debate on the relationship between digitality and context.  Some associate 
the digital with disembedding and disembeddedness: a releasing or an absence of the 
physical, institutional and relational ties that bind entities to a particular context 
(Fisher 2010).  Others have challenged this idea, seeing digital activity as having 
important geographic or other contextual roots (Graham 1998). 
 
This debate has touched all aspects of digital activity – digital politics, digital society 
– including our particular interest here, which is the digital economy and digital 
enterprise.  At one extreme, these may be seen to operate in some free-floating 
cyberspace detached from other context; at the other, they are seen to have important 
connections to local places, institutions and actors (Matuschewski 2006, McQuail 
2007).  And the debate also applies to a second focus for this paper: developing 
countries.  Some see digital technology levelling the playing field and enabling 
developing country economic activity to float free of, for example, local institutional 
and infrastructural constraints; others argue that digital activity in developing 
countries is largely defined by its social embeddedness in the local context (Avgerou 
2010, Murphy & Carmody 2015). 
 
While there has been an emergent vein of work on digital activity and embeddedness 
overall, there is very little written on this specifically in relation to the digital 
economy, and next to nothing on the digital economy in developing countries.  This, 
despite the acknowledged and growing importance of the digital sector within 
economic development (World Bank 2016), and the acknowledged importance of 
embedding and disembedding to economic development (Barber 1995). 
 
To address this knowledge gap, we undertook a study of digital start-ups in the global 
South, selecting examples from four Latin American countries.  The work reported 
here concentrates on the issues of embeddedness, seeking to understand whether, how 
and in what contexts Latin American digital start-ups are embedded; and the 
implications thereof. 
 
We next briefly review the notion of embeddedness, including a framework that was 
used to structure our enquiry, and its relation to digital enterprise.  Following an 
explanation of methods, our findings are presented, followed by a discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
2.0 Reviewing Digital Embeddedness 
The idea of embeddedness is invariably associated with the work of Polanyi (e.g. 
1944), despite his relatively limited use of the term (Beckert 2009), and is generally 
interpreted as the embedding of economic activity within a broader context of societal 
institutions such as policies and cultural values.  Polanyi (e.g. 1957) saw one process 
of capitalist development to be disembedding: the freeing of resources like labour and 
money from their socio-cultural ties through their commodification; thus making them 
more controllable (Wood et al 2016).  Others have seen a similar process of 
disembedding at play as the result of the digitisation of the economy: a 
commodification and virtualisation that disembeds core components of economic 
activity (Kallinikos 2006).  Though sometimes understood as a disembedding from 
institutional ties: de-institutionalisation, this is also often interpreted as a 
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disembedding from locality; a so-called de-territorialisation of economic activity 
(Toal 1999). 
 
But others have argued that notions of disembedding associated with the growing 
digital economy can be overblown; especially in broad-sweep discussions using rather 
excitable “weightless economy” labels (Quah 1999) or “world is flat” slogans 
(Friedman 2005).  The critiques have two main arguments.  First, that digital 
economic activity is not as disembedded as claimed, being still embedded in the two 
senses identified above: embedded in a local physical space and embedded in a set of 
local institutions.  Hence, for example, findings that digital enterprises tend to cluster 
together and draw heavily on physical interactions and on local infrastructural and 
educational institutions (Matuschewski 2006).  Second, that a re-embedding has 
occurred, particularly relating to a third sense of embeddedness: within networks.  A 
main driver of this notion has been Castells’ work (e.g. 2010) seeing digital 
technology driving a shift from physical place to network space, and research thus 
finding virtual networking to be increasingly important to digital enterprise (Sigfusson 
& Chetty 2013). 
 
So one dimension of debate about the digital economy relates to the extent of 
embedding, and also the type: territorial, institutional, network.  Another dimension 
relates to the impact of embeddedness, though here there is less disagreement.  
Embeddedness is understood to be both a strength but also a constraint (Uzzi 1997, 
Henderson et al 2002).  For example, embeddedness provides economic and cultural 
resources – access to finance and skills and ideas, knowledge of customers, a sense of 
purpose and identity, etc. – and the institutional foundations necessary for commercial 
transactions to take place.  On the other hand, embeddedness can constrain economic 
growth and innovation if it locks firms in to particular processes and markets. 
 
Discussion of embeddedness – extent, type, impact – has been a staple of economic 
sociology for a number of decades.  However, much less has been written about 
embeddedness of digital enterprises, and relatively little also about embeddedness of 
economic activity in developing countries.  Literature at the intersection of these 
strands – researching the embeddedness of digital enterprises in developing countries 
– has been very rare.  While many papers discuss the role of social context in shaping 
use of ICTs in developing countries (Avgerou 2010), very few look explicitly at 
embeddedness.  Two recent papers trace the disembedding associated with 
commodification of labour – some of which is developing country-based – in global 
production networks of digital work such as software development or online micro-
tasks (Flecker & Schonauer 2016, Wood et al 2016).  One paper looks directly at 
social/network embeddedness of digital entrepreneurs in China, finding that they are 
embedded in a mix of virtual and traditional social networks which support their 
economic activity (Avgerou & Li 2013). 
 
Yet developing country digital economies are already relatively sizeable.  For 
example, across Latin America as a whole the digital economy (goods and services 
that are wholly or principally reliant on digital technologies) contributes at least 2.0% 
of GDP in each country and 3.2% of GDP in the larger economies that are the focus in 
this paper (ECLAC 2013).  Digital growth rates are also high with, for example, fixed 
broadband use in Latin America growing by 16% per year in the 2010s and mobile 
broadband use growing by 73% per year (Katz 2015) and hence “the digital economy 
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is, by far, the biggest opportunity the region may explore” (Caride 2016).  Given the 
growing importance of the sector and the demonstrated importance of embeddedness, 
this created a knowledge gap which was worthy of addressing. 
 
In conceptualising the relation between embeddedness and digital enterprise in 
developing countries, there are various frameworks that might be used.  Early 
frameworks tend to be fairly uni-dimensional: for example Polanyi’s original notion 
of embedding within socio-economic institutions (Polanyi 1944), or Granovetter’s 
(1985) discussion of embedding within social networks.  Later models start to 
combine different senses of embedding: thus Zukin & DiMaggio (1990) incorporate 
both formal and informal institutions and network relations into their model of 
embeddedness.  But here we use a more recent and comprehensive approach that 
seeks to build on, and incorporate, all of these earlier ideas: Geels’ (2014) Triple 
Embeddedness Framework (TEF) (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Triple Embeddedness Framework 
 
The three embeddings relate to industry regime, economic environment, and socio-
political environment: “Interactions between firms-in-industries and social groups in 
economic and socio-political environments can be regarded as ‘horizontal’ 
embeddedness, while relations between incumbent firms and industry regimes can be 
seen as ‘vertical embeddedness’” (ibid.:267).  In terms of the three types of 
embeddedness identified earlier – territorial, institutional, network – the TEF 
therefore focuses mainly on the latter two much more than the former.  This was seen 
as appropriate for digital enterprises which – due to their virtualised products and 
processes – are more limited in their connections to immediate physical place. 
 
Summarising across an array of literature, the TEF identifies four types of institution 
into which (digital) enterprises might be embedded: 
 Functional-cognitive: technical knowledge and routines. 
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 Cultural-cognitive: mindsets around the nature of reality, and interpretations of the wider 
environment and pressures. 
 Normative: norms of appropriate behaviours, identity, societal purpose, etc. 
 Formal-regulative: regulations and policies and laws and standards. 
The TEF considers network embeddedness particularly in terms of network position; 
for example, “core”, “middle” and “peripheral” firms.  These are understood in 
relation to institutions, with core firms creating or determining or shaping institutions, 
and peripheral firms not being institution makers but equally being less bound by 
institutional forces in the network.  These varying institutional capabilities derive 
from the power associated with different network positions, and core and periphery 
and network embedding must therefore also be understood in terms of determinants of 
power, especially the quantity and quality (e.g. trust) of relational ties (Henderson et 
al 2002). 
 
3.0 Research Methods 
This research approaches the notion of embeddedness from a critical realist 
perspective (e.g. Mingers 2004), with place, institutions and networks understood to 
have an intransitive existence independent of our knowledge of them, and to generate 
causal mechanisms that impact, for example, the economic trajectory of digital 
enterprises.  The stratified nature of reality within a critical realist paradigm (ibid.) 
means that these foundations of embeddedness cannot be directly experienced.  Our 
understanding of them must therefore be built from triangulation which was 
implemented using a field study research strategy – “study of single or multiple and 
related processes/phenomena in single or multiple organizations” (Palvia et al. 
2007:2) – and a multi-method qualitative research design. 
 
The potential frame for the study was all of Latin America but time and access 
constraints meant we focused on just four countries – Argentina, Brazil, Colombia 
and Mexico – the four largest economies which together account for around three-
quarters of regional GDP (IMF 2016).  Given their importance to the future digital 
economy, we decided to focus on digital start-ups (DSs), which we defined as 
recently-created enterprises that only produce digital products (goods or services).  
We operationalised this by selecting enterprises less than three years old at the time of 
contact.  However, to ensure source triangulation, we also included in the field study 
other organisations that support or relate to digital start-ups. 
  
In total, 40 organisations were incorporated into the study: 19 digital start-ups; five 
“accelerators” which act to facilitate growth of digital start-ups; five digital economy 
investors; and 11 other digital eco-system actors (government agencies, digital 
multinationals, and training, education and research agencies).  There being no 
directory of digital start-ups, they and the other agencies were identified mainly by 
purposive sampling, partly using snowballing techniques.  Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in these organisations during 2013-2015 with 46 interviews 
conducted in total (six respondents were interviewed twice).  Some method 
triangulation was incorporated through direct observation of four events: two 
“investors’ days” at which digital start-ups pitched business plans (one in Mexico, one 
in Argentina), and two “Startup Weekends” that were mainly training events for 




Data from the different sources and methods was transcribed as text and coded via 
NVivo using template analysis (King 2012).  Initial codes were created deductively on 
the basis of the TEF but with later iteration – removal and addition of codes – as 
analysis proceeded.  For dissemination purposes, the names of all organisations 




4.1 Hybrid Industry Regime Embeddedness: Product and Digital Sectors 
As conceived and operationalised within the TEF, enterprises are embedded within a 
single industry regime.  However, what emerged from fieldwork is that digital start-
ups are different, and – to varying degrees – have a dual or hybrid embeddedness that 
relates to two different industry regimes.  They are embedded within a product (goods 
or services) sector: for example, “Investarg” that enables online stock market 
investing within the local financial services sector; or “Domserv” that operates a web 
service for hiring domestic employees  within the recruitment sector.  But they are 
also all embedded within a cross-cutting “digital sector”. 
 
The extent of institutional and relational forces and, hence, embedding, differs in 
these two sectors.  Typically the product sector is mature, having been in existence for 
decades.  There exists a relatively-formalised set of knowledge and regulations; there 
exist common mindsets and norms.  As Geels (2014) notes, these institutional forces 
act as a constraint on innovation: the more embedded a firm is, the more difficulty it 
will have in changing them.  And the forces act as a brake on innovation.  When start-
up “Insurarg” began discussing its plans for online insurance, existing firms and 
related actors in the insurance service sector sought to dissuade them, and also were 
unwilling to follow suit because of the lock-in of their existing physical assets and 
practices.  Most digital start-ups must therefore not be so embedded in their product 
sector that they cannot innovate.  If they are, they will seek means to disembed 
themselves: for example, the e-entrepreneurs behind Insurarg split their digital start-
up into a new enterprise, to avoid the normative and cognitive institutional constraints 
they perceived within the existing company. 
 
On the other hand, DSs must be sufficiently embedded in the product sector that they 
have sufficient power – sectoral social and knowledge capital, and other resources – 
to understand the sector, and to battle against the forces of institutional lock-in.  Many 
digital start-up failures can be laid at the door of inadequate embedding in the product 
sector, especially a failure of sectoral knowledge.  Other digital start-ups struggled 
when they were too peripheral and weakly embedded.  For example, online lens retail 
start-up “Optocol” lacked strong knowledge of and structural relations within the 
optometry sector.  As a result existing players were able to mobilise their relations: 
suppliers were persuaded not to sell lenses to Optocol, media contacts were used to 
put out negative publicity, and policy-makers were lobbied to ban sales of lenses 
without a visit to an optician.  Others still have recognised their lack of product sector 
embedding and sought to compensate for it.  “Intelliad” was set up by a serial digital 
entrepreneur to work in online advertising.  This digital background enabled the start-
up to develop a new form of ‘intelligent’ banner ads for web sites.  While readily 
accepted by other digital firms, the product struggled to scale beyond this niche until 
Intelliad created new relations in the product sector.  It partnered with existing 
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marketing agencies who could ‘translate’ the product and package it alongside other 
marketing offerings for their traditional customer base. 
 
This last is an example of hybrid embedding via institutional and relational formation: 
a structural partnership combining digital and product sector actors; and processes and 
service offerings that combine digital and product sector components.  From this we 
see that digital start-ups are also embedded within the digital sector.  At the most 
straightforward level, they draw knowledge from that sector – business ideas, 
processes, technologies – and they draw digital skills.  Yet the digital sector contrasts 
with most product sectors: in terms of actors it is barely a decade or two old; it is 
often only very recently that it has developed an identity as a sector within the 
countries of Latin America; and it is still very much in process of institution and 
relation formation.  Hence, it is only recently that there is anything like a digital sector 
in which digital start-ups could become embedded. 
 
4.2 Hybrid Industry Regime Embeddedness: Local and Global 
To understand this better, we must understand where the institutions of the digital 
sector have come from.  There are two main sources.  First, endogenous sources; 
especially local core digital firms: those few that survived or emerged from the 
dotcom crash of the early 2000s in Latin America.  Interviewees identified examples 
including Mercado Libre, Despegar, and Globant.  These and a small number of 
others have created a series of institutions that have given existence and form to the 
local digital sector.  This has been facilitated by the creation of ‘accelerators’: 
organisations with the specific purpose of enabling digital enterprises to grow.  
Finally, as the number of digital start-ups has grown, entrepreneurs themselves have 
taken sector-forming actions. 
 
In a number of cases, institution-formation has organisational substance and therefore 
relates to both institutional and network aspects of embedding: 
 creation of national digital industry associations, a number of which are linked regionally 
via ALETI, the regional ICT sector federation; 
 creation of informal communities of practice or support groups based around specific 
technologies or techniques or enterprise types and locations; 
 holding workshops, hackathons and similar events. 
These in turn build cultural-cognitive and normative forces: a common language in 
talking about the digital sector, a common mindset about digital enterprise, a sectoral 
identity, some cooperative norms, etc.  And functional-cognitive foundations are built 
by sharing ideas and knowledge, with circulation increasingly rich through the 
sectoral organisations noted above, through the core firms – whose staff often break 
off to set up their own digital start-ups – and through the accelerators which provide 
explicit training events but which also informally share more tacit knowledge.  More 
generally, core firms and accelerators act as network hubs within the digital sector – 
core nodes in the ecosystem – that link out to sources of skills and knowledge (e.g. 
universities), sources of finance (e.g. angel and venture investors), sources of custom 
(e.g. large organisations), and sources of formal-regulative institutions (e.g. policy 
makers in local and national government). 
 
Notwithstanding this recent upward curve of structural – organisational network and 
institutional – formation in the digital sectors of Latin American countries, 
endogenous sources have been historically weak.  Part of the solution – or perhaps 
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part of the underlying problem – has been extensive use of exogenous sources of 
institution formation.  In particular, this has come from the global core for the digital 
economy: the United States.  Much of this relates to functional-cognitive institutions 
in the form of technical knowledge and routines; particularly the use of Lean Startup 
(including related techniques like Business Model Canvas). 
 
Lean Startup is a framework or more precisely a methodology for enterprise start-up 
that originates in the US, and it had been used by virtually all of the digital start-ups 
interviewed for this research.  Its dissemination into the Latin American digital 
economy has been facilitated by a number of intermediaries.  Some are US-based, 
such as the non-profit organisation UP Global (taken over by Techstars in 2015) 
which has run a series of events around Latin America such as “Startup Weekends”, 
based around the Lean Startup methodology.  Others are Latin America-based, such 
as the local accelerators which provide similar training workshops and will also 
arrange mentoring on start-up methodologies for local e-entrepreneurs.  Likewise 
some national government programmes – such as Apps.com in Colombia – have 
arranged for US trainers to come in to teach Lean Startup.  As a result, Lean Startup 
and Business Model Canvas had become institutionalised as the “industry recipe” for 
digital start-ups in Latin America: entrepreneurs, accelerators, investors all expected 
to see the rapid cycles of product development, market testing, pivoting, and feedback 
loops prescribed by these frameworks. 
 
Even more concretely, some Latin American digital start-ups had built their whole 
business model on imitation of US digital businesses.  As one interviewee noted: 
“Mercadolibre.com was based on eBay, Despegar.com was based on Orbitz … 
Restorando is based on Open Table, Best City is like Amazon” and other e-
entrepreneurs admitted they had copied specific US businesses and transplanted them 
for Latin American markets.  Alongside visits to the US and looking at US businesses 
online,  other formal channels for this type of knowledge transfer from the US to 
Latin America include media sites such as Hacker News and TechCrunch, to which 
the great majority of e-entrepreneurs subscribed. 
 
These various sources for flows of knowledge did more than just transfer functional-
cognitive knowledge; they also developed other institutional forces within Latin 
America.  Those involved in digital business came to share a common mindset, for 
example, around expectations of success and failure (greater expectations of success 
but also greater allowance for failure than found more typically in Latin America); 
and around normative values (a common hemispheric identity of digital enterprise, 
and interviewees commenting on the ‘dress-down’ norms found at digital sector 
events – even those run by government – which diverged from broader business 
norms in the region).  There were even some signs of US influence on formal-
regulative institutions in the region.  For example, Google had set up Google Policy 
which includes policy advocacy among its activities in the region; supporting laws on 
issues such as e-business and intellectual property rights that would tend towards 
regulative convergence between Latin America and the US. 
 
As a result of this, the digital start-ups in Latin America have a second type of dual or 
hybrid embedding: that they are embedded in a mix of endogenous and exogenous – 
perhaps, more simply, local and global – digital sector institutions.  They draw 
knowledge, worldviews, values, and regulations from the local context but they also 
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draw the same things directly from the global/US context (and indirectly given US 
influence on the local context institutions).  An alternative perspective, then, would be 
that this represents a partial disembedding from the local context.  One could see this 
quite readily in the interviews, with US terms and ideas and businesses frequently 
cropping up, and with the US often seen as the aspirational utopia: Silicon Valley as 
the promised land that a lucky few might one day reach. 
 
4.3 Economic and Socio-Political Environment Embeddedness 
Finally, we can identify a third type of hybrid embeddedness: this time a triple rather 
than dual embedding, and reflecting the domains described in the Triple 
Embeddedness Framework.  While the boundaries of the three domains are fuzzy, the 
findings above have particularly sought to discuss the industry regimes (digital and 
product, local and global) into which Latin American digital start-ups are (partly) 
embedded.  But they are also embedded into their economic environment and their 
socio-political environment, as we now explore further. 
 
Embeddedness in the local economic environment is something of a mixed blessing.  
For example, in comparative terms, GDP per capita levels and digital connectivity 
levels are lower in Latin America than in the global North, which constrains 
opportunities in – and the size of – the local digital economy (OECD 2015).  
However, there is a growing middle class in Latin America that is increasingly 
digitally-connected, and this provides the main market and future opportunity for 
digital start-ups.  Knowledge of this consumer group, knowledge of markets and 
supply chains in product and digital sectors, and broader knowledge of economic 
institutions in Latin America has been the foundation for all of the digital start-ups.  
As an example, a change in the law in Colombia led to a sudden increase in the 
number of older, second-hand cars being bought and run, and a demand from middle-
class owners for trustworthy spare parts and servicing.  Recognition of this 
opportunity underpinned the creation of the “Autocol” digital start-up which provides 
online booking of repairs and servicing with guaranteed parts sourced online and 
fitted by certified auto-service partners. 
 
This local institutional knowledge and broader embedding in organisational relations 
has acted as a barrier to external competitors: interviewees cited examples of US and 
other global North digital firms that had failed or struggled to enter the Latin 
American market.  Of course, that works two ways – digital enterprises built on 
specific local knowledge/relations and a market niche would themselves struggle to 
internationalise.  However, a number had been able to use their local economic base 
as a source of wider competitive advantage, with one-third – typically those offering 
non-location-specific digital services like education or online marketing, and able to 
work in English as well as Spanish/Portuguese – having overseas customers. 
 
There was a somewhat similar sense in relation to investment.  Local economic 
embedding – again institutional knowledge and network relations – gave digital start-
ups access to finance at various points in their lives: conception-stage investment 
from family/friends; early-stage investment from government grants or local seed 
investors; growth-stage investment from venture capitalists.  In some cases, this 
investment would come from external sources.  Typically this would be US investors 
– brokered by the national accelerators or by larger digital firms in the local market – 
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who otherwise would not invest due to their lack of knowledge of Latin American 
markets and other institutions. 
 
But the US funding ebbed and flowed depending on the stability of those markets.  
Inherent institutional instabilities in Latin America have led to periods of economic 
instability, including currency devaluation (Reyes & Sawyer 2016).  This has 
dissuaded potential digital economy investors and/or made them shift only into lower-
risk investments.  Institutional constraints have also hampered local investment.  The 
limited history and size of the digital economy means there is limited knowledge of it 
among investors; not just the lack of technical knowledge of how to value digital 
enterprises and the tendency to use traditional methods which discourage investment, 
but also a lack of narratives among investors of successful investments.  In addition, 
the high attrition rate of digital start-ups is problematic in some countries where 
complexity or risk of liability and bankruptcy legislation steers investment into safer, 
more traditional sectors. 
 
This last point can also be seen as an example of political embeddedness: the way in 
which digital start-ups are enmeshed in the formal-regulative institutions of their 
context.  There have certainly be benefits as national governments around Latin 
America have sought to promote the digital economy.  ICT infrastructure policy has 
accelerated the digital foundations necessary for the start-ups and their markets 
through a mix of deregulation, encouragement of competition, reduced taxes, but also 
interventions including subsidies such as universal service funding, and broad-scale 
programmes for ICT skills training (Gallego & Gutierrez 2015).  More specifically 
there have been digital economy policies that have been almost entirely state 
interventions: training programmes to build higher-level skills such as programming 
or Lean Startup, seed funding for digital start-ups, and institution-formation.  The 
latter has included less formal relations such as mentoring programmes or digital 
enterprise networking events, or more formal organisations such as digital 
accelerators and incubators.  Interviewees testified to the way in which these 
government actions had directly supported formation of individual enterprises; 
indirectly acted “as a catalyst in weak and embryonal ecosystems, leveraging or 
creating institutional infrastructure and the actors that bring them to life” (Kantis et al 
2012:39); and even more indirectly raised and legitimised the profile of digital start-
ups helping, for example, to encourage others to invest. 
 
But political embeddedness also has its downsides.  Complex labour laws, weak 
intellectual property protection, cumbersome contract enforcement mechanisms, 
business unfriendly bankruptcy laws, and ineffective judicial enforcement systems 
were all reported by interviewees to have had a chilling effect on digital business 
investment and activity.  So too do the vulnerabilities of political institutions more 
broadly in Latin America which bring periods of political as well as macro-economic 
instability. 
 
Finally, knowledge of the local social environment was essential for the digital start-
ups: of course knowledge of Spanish and/or Portuguese but, beyond that, interviewees 
mentioned country-specific accents and idioms that help make a connection with local 
consumers, and build business.  Trust was also repeatedly mentioned by interviewees: 
something that particularly tends to be in short supply when national institutions are 
relatively weak (Martinez & Williams 2010).  In combination with local market 
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knowledge, working to build trust meant different things: for some digital start-ups, it 
meant working with established partners in the product sector; for others, it meant 
incorporating human intermediaries into transaction chains since customers were used 
to human contact. 
 
But general lack of trust could also provide a space for innovation.  In the Autocol 
example already cited, a key problem for consumers was their lack of trust in auto-
servicing firms and the lack of knowledge and circulating information about quality of 
parts and servicing.  Identifying these institutional weaknesses, Autocol was able to 
build an online business which creation an institution of trust.  Similarly, Easy Taxi 
has been able to expand its online Uber-like business into a number of Latin 
American markets partly because local taxis were not trusted due to safety fears 
(Morantes 2016).  So while, in general, institutional shortcomings in Latin America 
constrain digital start-ups, they sometimes highlight a business opportunity. 
 
5.0 Discussion 
Far from the notions of a disembedded digital economy, the Latin American digital 
start-ups we studied are multiply-embedded.  We found evidence that they are 
embedded in all three of the domains identified by the TEF: technical knowledge, 
worldviews, norms, regulations and relations from industry regimes underpin the 
activities of e-entrepreneurs and their enterprises but can be a drag on innovation; the 
economic environment provides their markets and funding though also constrains 
these as well; the socio-political environment similarly and simultaneously supports 
and inhibits them. 
 
Inherent to the TEF, and reflected in these findings, is a multiple embedding in these 
three domains: all enterprises are seen as somehow hybrids of industry, economic and 
socio-political context – what Geels calls a combined vertical and horizontal 
embedding.  But – alongside this domain hybridity – the digital start-ups were seen to 
have two other types of dual or hybrid embeddedness.  First, was a sectoral hybridity, 
with the DSs embedded at the intersection of both a more-established product sector 
and a less-established, emergent digital sector.  Second, was a scalar hybridity, with 
DSs embedded more-strongly in their local (national) context and less-strongly in a 
global (US-oriented) context. 
 
These different dimensions of embeddedness were interconnected.  In particular, there 
was a lack of institutions within the local digital sector.  Yet, as we have seen, 
institutions of all kinds – functional-cognitive, cultural-cognitive, normative, and 
formal-regulative – are required if enterprises and their broader sectors are to 
function.  So, especially in the last decade or so, there has been a necessary process of 
institution formation in Latin American digital economies.  Local actors have worked 
to create these institutions; for example, government has set up policies and 
organisations; entrepreneurs and accelerators have created communities, groups and 
events; local associations have created norms and shared technical knowledge.  But 
institutional forms have also been drafted in from outside, especially from the US: 
technical ideas, business models, start-up methodologies, digital sector norms and 
aspirations and identity, even policy templates. 
 
US actors have partly been responsible for this institutional induction, and for some 
level of resource inflows such as skills and finance.  But a key role has been played by 
12 
 
intermediary organisations.  Some of these – such as UP Global or Google Policy – 
have been US-based organisations stepping in to connect with actors within Latin 
American markets.  Others – such as accelerators and government agencies – have 
been Latin America-based organisations stepping out to connect with US actors. 
 
The incipient – weak or absent – nature of institutions and relations in the digital 
sector is mirrored by the typical strength of institutions and relations within the 
product sectors in which digital start-ups operate.  As Geels (2014) predicts, strong 
embedding within those institutions is generally a barrier to innovation: a mutual 
interactive process of institution-formation and behaviour-shaping means that long-
term incumbents have limited incentive to innovate and limited ability to do so.  
Hybridity here has been an asset for many DSs.  Being partly embedded into two 
sectors, they are not fully-embedded in either (or, where they are strongly embedded 
in the product sector, they have taken actions to partly disembed themselves, as in the 
case of Insurarg).  They have been able to cross-fertilise knowledge and other 
institutional forms from one sector to the other (often globally-sourced in the case of 
the digital sector).  But that disembedding must not be too great: again, we saw 
examples of relatively-disembedded enterprises struggling or failing as a result of 
their lack of knowledge, relations, norms, etc. 
 
We thus get a sense of what might be called “Goldilocks embeddedness”: those digital 
start-ups that succeed do so because they are neither too heavily-embedded nor too 
heavily-disembedded but their level of embedding is “just right”.  The clearest 
evidence of this related to the product sector but we could also understand it in other 
terms.  In relation to the digital sector, institutions and relations are relatively 
formative so enterprises cannot yet be too-strongly-embedded in this sector.  In 
local/global terms, DSs that were internationally successful were sufficiently 
embedded in their local markets to understand them and to build a business, but not so 
embedded that they could not transfer their services or business model into overseas 
markets. 
 
We can also interpret this “just right” notion in terms of network position and 
embeddedness, using Geels’ (ibid.) language of core and periphery.  Within the 
product sector regimes, successful DSs must not be so core that they are trapped as if 
in institutional concrete, but not so peripheral that they lack access to circuits of 
knowledge and capital and other resources.  Within the digital sector regime, core 
actors – long-standing firms and accelerators and e-entrepreneurs – have been 
institution-makers across the whole gamut of cognitive and normative institutions.  
They have also been connective hubs, intermediating between actors and linking 
digital start-ups to ideas, investors, mentors, etc.  But we can expand the scope of the 
network we analyse to a global level. 
 
From this perspective, the US is the core of the digital economy, and Latin American 
digital sectors are on the periphery.  The US has been an institution-maker and Latin 
America an institution-taker if we think of all the types of knowledge, norms, policy 
forms, etc that flow from North to South, enabled by “core-periphery” intermediaries 
like UP Global and “periphery-core” intermediaries like Latin American accelerators.  
This one-way flow reflects the relative institutional shortcomings of the Latin 
American digital economy: a relative institutional vacuum into which US institutions 
will flow.  And we saw other disadvantages of the institutional shortcomings 
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associated with economies more on the global periphery
1
: instabilities, uncertainties 
and absences that all constrain levels of digital start-up, investment, growth, etc. 
 
But peripherality is not all bad news.  One can envisage a semi-permeable membrane 
around Latin America’s digital economies.  Institutions – at least in the form of 
knowledge flows – move fairly readily from core to periphery across that membrane, 
assisted by the intermediaries that act as transport points.  But flow in the opposite 
direction is more constrained.  This limits foreign investment but it also partly 
protects local economies from competition – only those who are embedded inside the 
membrane understand local institutions well enough to compete.  And understanding 
those local institutions means understanding both their strengths but also their 
shortcomings; shortcomings which can sometimes be commuted into digital business 
opportunities as start-ups replace weak existing institutions with stronger digital 
versions. 
 
If relative peripherality was the first  main feature of Latin American digital start-ups 
compared to other types of start-up, then this last point touches on their second main 
feature: digitality.  We see this directly reflected in the sectoral hybridity: the 
straddling of two sectors or industry regimes because all DSs belong to the digital 
sector.  The relative lack of institutional and relational ossification in this sector has 
been the springboard for innovation: for many entrepreneurs and enterprises their 
level of embeddedness in the digital sector is “just right”.  To a small extent, digitality 
may also shape the scalar hybridity: digital enterprises are more readily visible across 
national boundaries and to global (e.g. US) actors; and they can more readily reach 
out across those boundaries e.g. to customers, investors and others.  So, again, at least 




Digitality – including digital enterprise – is associated in some readings with a 
disembedding; a release from institutional forces; particularly localised institutional 
forces.  There is an element of this seen from the current research: these Latin 
American digital start-ups can be read as partly disembedded from certain institutional 
environments.  This allows them to combine knowledge across sectors and across 
scales; a capability that underpins their innovation, internationalisation and flexibility 
of operation.  But, conversely, we can equally read them as embedded in multiple 
environments: product and digital sectors, local and global scales, vertical (industry 
regime) and horizontal (economic and socio-political environment) domains.  More 
than simply being multiply embedded, they are hybridly embedded; a hybridity that 
draws from the two particular features of Latin American DSs – that they are 
relatively peripheral in the world economy, and that they are digital.  Particularly from 
their sectoral and scalar hybrid embedding arises the potential – but also the necessity 
– for cross-fertilisation of knowledge.  Where network connections and extent of 
embedding across the different contexts allows this cross-flow of knowledge, then 
innovation and growth are the outcome.  Where embedding and connections are too 
weak, problems arise. 
 
                                                 
1
 Latin American economies are perhaps better thought of as “semi-periphery”, but for simplicity we 
will just focus here on their relative peripherality vis-a-vis the US. 
14 
 
In terms of the three types of embedding presented earlier – place, institutional, 
network – there was little evidence found of physical embedding in an actual locale.  
There were physical elements but they were transient: the meeting of an association, 
or attendance at a Startup Weekend.  The “local” and ideas of place were both 
understood and analysed here largely in terms of the national context of institutions 
and relations.  The digital start-ups were embedded in the space of networks.  This 
was seen especially in relationships mediated online with suppliers and customers and 
other sources of knowledge and resources.  Where these were US or other overseas 
networks, there was some element of zero-sum game: that embedding in global 
networks mirrored some disembedding from local networks.  But the digital start-ups 
nonetheless remained clearly embedded in local networks: there were few if any that 
were truly “born global”. 
 
Being at least partly embedded in local industry regimes, economic and socio-political 
environments in developing countries puts Latin American digital start-ups at the 
relative periphery of world economic networks.  This did have its downside in relation 
to weaker institutions and relational ties.  But these were less than anticipated, partly 
because their digitality helps DSs overcome distance from the economic core, and 
partly because Latin America is more semi-periphery than periphery.  As a result, 
ideas and some other resources could flow in to assist the start-ups but they had some 
relative protection from external competition, and could even find business 
opportunities in the weaknesses of local institutions. 
 
Governments in Latin America have been relatively supportive of digital start-ups; 
implicitly recognising the need for institution formation within the digital sector and 
developing a set of interventions that have enabled this.  This certainly needs to 
continue.  As reflected in the partial global embedding of DSs, local digital sector 
institutions are still relatively weak, and government can particularly recognise the 
value of network intermediaries that are themselves institution builders and relation 
builders both within the local digital economy and between local and global digital 
economies.  The dual sectoral embeddedness of digital enterprises is harder to address 
but it reflects a broader issue: that the notion of a bounded digital economy is giving 
way to a bleeding of the digital economy into all product sectors.  Hence, that product 
sector policy must increasing become digitally-literate, and recognise the hybridity 
seen on the ground. 
 
One strategic implication for Latin American digital start-ups is their need to 
recognise the multiple and hybrid nature of their embedding.  For example, to 
recognise the Goldilocks “sweet spot” and self-analyse the extent of constraint and 
freedom imposed by embedding in both digital and product sectors.  Another 
implication is the applicability of business ideas, of business strategies, and of 
business methodologies like Lean Startup which are all accessible because of the DSs 
partial global/US embedding.  These assume relatively mature and stable institutional 
contexts; enabling a focus solely on the economics across a single supply chain.  This 
assumption mismatched the complexity of sitting at the intersection of two sectors, 
and the relative volatility of being embedded within a developing country institutional 
environment.  The result is a continuous need to customise knowledge to the reality 
and complexity of DS embedding.  For example, with Lean Startup needing to be re-
scoped to take a broader bi-sectoral and socio-political remit, and with the start-up 




Finally, we can note some theoretical implications.  The Triple Embeddedness 
Framework was a useful starting architecture for understanding the embeddedness of 
digital start-ups in Latin America.  But because of their two features – digitality and 
peripherality – these enterprises ask for a more complex conception of embedding; 
particularly in understanding the industry regime.  The sectoral hybridity that arises 
from digitality requires two industry regimes to be analysed.  The scalar hybridity that 
arises from peripherality requires multiple scales of industry regime to be analysed.  
Both of these complexify the ideas of core and periphery with, for example, local 
accelerators being peripheral to the core (US/global) industry regime, but core to the 
peripheral (national/Latin American) industry regimes.  These actors also highlight 
the need for analysis of network positions including hubs and intermediaries.  These 
were seen to be essential to institutional flow between the different contexts into 
which Latin American digital start-ups were partly embedded, and particularly to the 
core process highlighted in the study: the flow of knowledge. 
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